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This paper deals with the question concerning the effects of the sense of self on agency, 
particularly the implications that a disharmonious sense of self can have for agency. 
Consciousness, as intimately connected with a sense of self has a unique status in being 
accessible both from a first-person and a third-person perspective. A study of self therefore 
requires phenomenological approaches as well as neurological, psychological or sociological 
ones. A promising approach to understanding how the sense of self affects agency is studying 
pathologies. Such studies support the view that both the sense and the conception of self as 
unified and as an initiator of agency are valued, while a sense of conflict or dissonance is avoided. 
The frequency with which confabulations occur in pathologies of self can be taken as an indicator 
that distortions of perception, memory and narration are considered a fair price to pay to 
counteract a sense of diffused self. The picture or narrative of the self that is thereby produced 
necessarily involves a sense of what the individual regards as good. However a strong urge to 
maintain an idealised, unified and stable picture of self and agency may involve the danger that 
mechanisms used against a diffusion of the self misrepresent both self and the other.
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Two points tend to stand out in the debate around the question concerning the 
self. One deals with the metaphysical respectability of the self; is it real or an 
illusion? The other is concerned with its nature and number; is the self a unified, 
singular entity or is there a multitude of selves in a given moment or during a 
lifetime? Another set of questions lags a little behind in popularity but is in fact 
just as central to an exhaustive picture of the self: what are the conditions of 
agency, should the self be understood as an agent and what is the relationship 
between self and agency? Specifically, the phenomenological study of self and 
agency includes the role that the conception of self plays in an individual’s 
understanding and realisation of agency.
Certain assumptions surrounding such questions should be clarified. Some 
assume that there is such a thing as self or that there are certain qualities that it 
has. This can be contrasted with another assumption, i.e. that individuals have 
conceptions of what a self is. These two aspects should not be confused; one 
concerns the nature of self, if it exists; the other what individuals take their selves 
to be. Using the term “individual” here aims to suspend judgement on whether 
an individual is identical with her self or if she had better be understood as the 
owner of her self. These two notions should further be distinguished from a 
“sense of self”, which denotes a primary, pre-reflective, experiential feeling of 
what it’s like to be a certain individual in a given moment. A further assumption 
is that the self should be understood as an initiator of action as opposed to an 
epiphenomenon. 
Self and agency are thus thought to be closely related when it comes to 
considering which characteristics of individuals are necessary for agency. 
A number of these characteristics seem to call for an agent who is unified 
both diachronically and synchronically. Synchronic unity is thought to be 
necessary for the capability to choose and implement action; diachronic unity 
is thought to be necessary for accountability, responsibility and the capability 
of judging, choosing and following up long-term actions. The notion of 
agency seems to need a unified self as the initiator and carrier of action, while 
conversely the fact that a single individual can only act out a single course of 
action at a given time is used as an argument to strengthen the picture of a 
unified agent (Korsgaard 2003).
A further step is that of conceptual clarification and an evaluation of the 
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appropriate uses of the term “self”. Not only is there no consensus on 
what the “self” is supposed to be but the debate is additionally made more 
difficult by the fact that related questions are discussed under a number of 
terms. Among the terms popularly used are “Person”, “I”, “Ego”, “Subject”, 
“Identity” or even “Soul” and though different discourses prefer different 
terms and disregard others, their connotations can be unclear. Thus, 
some argue that the whole concept of self should be disregarded since the 
confusion about what it is supposed to denote might be taken as an indicator 
that it does not exist (Olson 1998). 
Nevertheless it seems safe to assume that there is enough of a “self” to be used as 
a tool and to be problematised both as concept and as phenomenon. It also seems 
relatively safe to assume that apart from certain pathologies most people tend to 
experience some sort of a self. Even in cultures where the self is (dis)regarded as 
an illusion, it is thought of as something that needs to be overcome by training 
and reflection. A sense of self, it seems, has a strong pre-reflective presence but 
it has a precarious status in hard sciences since there is a uniquely first person 
access to it which the traditional reliance on objectivism in natural sciences tends 
to eye with suspicion. The first-person perspective makes the self categorically 
different than any other thing that can be studied because it cannot be grasped 
without taking that perspective into account.
Studying pathologies is a way to combine both aspects by comparing first person 
reports of senses of self and agency with neurological or psychological anomalies. 
These can provide indications for the relationship between the structure of the 
central nervous system and the function of parts of it as concerns a sense of 
self. There is an abundance of “pathologies of the self”, which indicate that the 
seemingly given sense of self is nourished by a complex interaction of neurological, 
psychological, social and possibly self-constitutional sources. By studying such 
pathologies one might hope to abstract certain factors and thereby gradually 
develop a broader theory on the various contributors to the sense of self. 
Some such pathologies of the self are directly related to the question of 
embodiment. The self is sometimes regarded as disembodied. We tend to have 
no difficulties imagining ourselves as living in another time, as another person, 
of another gender, age or with other physical characteristics than those that we 
have1. It is quite another thing, however, to imagine ourselves as being another 
being. A famous account of the irreducibility of the first person account of what 
it feels like to be a certain being is the impossibility of imagining what it feels like 
1 A literary example of this is Virgina Woolf’s Orlando.
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to be a bat (Nagel 1979). In fact, one needn’t go further than the next best person 
to see that the particular feel of a self cannot be captured by anything else but by 
the self itself. Descartes argued that the fact of our ability to imagine ourselves 
without a body at all demonstrates that the ego is of another substance than our 
material bodies. We are not our bodies, our bodies are not even part of us, rather 
we own our bodies, just as one owns a toolbox2. In fact, the conviction that one’s 
body is not one’s own or that parts of it don’t belong to it carries with it a strong 
feeling of estrangement and discomfort. Patients who suffer from asomatognosia 
do not recognise parts of their bodies and reject them as alien (Feinberg 2001, p. 
8) and in some cases this is coupled with impaired proprioception, the sense of 
the position of the body in space (Feinberg 2001, p. 11). Fantastic confabulations 
can occur when patients are asked to identify one of their limbs, attributing 
the limb to a spouse or a family member or even attributing a self of their own 
to the wayward limb, giving them names and speaking of them in the third 
person (Feinberg 2001, p. 15). It is noteworthy that such patients, suffering from 
a strong sense of estrangement of parts of their bodies tend to try and integrate 
the phenomenon into a unified picture of themselves and their surroundings 
that makes sense and maintains a feeling of familiarity. This is one of the 
many indications that the sense of a unified self with clear margins is a valued 
feeling while that of detachment and disintegration is experienced as decidedly 
unpleasant or even painful3. 
Another prominent example of the failure of the brain to produce a “normal” 
sense of self is the Capgras syndrome (Ramachandran 2003). A patient suffering 
from the Capgras syndrome misidentifies a usually very close person as an 
impostor. The Capgras syndrome is significant because it indicates that the 
capability of cognitively recognising an individual is not sufficient to identify 
her as that individual if a certain feeling of relatedness lacks. While we tend to 
think that it’s the cognitive familiarity with a person that is the cause of a sense 
of emotional familiarity, the Capgras syndrome indicates that there are two 
independent pathways involved, at the failure any of which the recognition fails 
to take place. Patients complain that the person in question is in every respect 
identical to their spouse, their mother or their friend but that they don’t feel 
like them, therefore they reason, they can’t be them. The dissonance that exists 
2 This sense of one’s self as a mental entity that owns the body is very common, “It 
connects with a feeling that nearly everyone has had intensely at some time – the 
feeling that one’s body is just a vehicle or vessel for the mental thing that is what 
one really or most essentially is”, (Strawson 1999, p. 3). 
3 There is a suggestion that the feeling that we are continuingly present persons as 
opposed to construction out of temporal entities might have a biological basis (Kim, 
J. & Sosa, E. 1999, p. 329).
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between their recognition of the person and the lacking emotional response 
creates an urge for a resolution and results in a Capgras delusion. The failure of 
various brain regions involved in the creation of recognition and the ensuing 
hardly credible explanations by the patients indicate not only that the inter-
relational creation of the self-other complex is a function of different centers 
converging on one narrative but also that the production of such a narrative 
seems to be of utmost importance to the individual4. 
Another example for a change in the margins of the self is the Frégoli syndrome, 
quasi the opposite of the Capgras syndrome. Here the patient experiences a 
relatedness, which is not grounded in prior experience and strangers or casual 
acquaintances are attributed a position of much closer relationship with the 
patient. These examples of mistaken relatedness occur also with places or with 
objects, familiar from patients who mistake the hospital for their house (Feinberg 
2001, p. 49). Dissociative fugue, on the other hand, is a mental disorder, the 
sufferer of which travels away from home or from the accustomed places of 
their lives without remembering part or all of their past. Part of this disorder is a 
complete or partial confusion of identity, occasionally with the assumption of a 
new one (American Psychiatric Association 2000, pp. 300-313). 
Autoscopia is a hallucination in which the patient projects herself into the 
outside world (Feinberg 2001, p. 80). The Doppelgänger appears often but not 
necessarily always ghost-like and mimics the patient. It is remarkable that these 
hallucinations are visual; the hallucinating subject creates itself as an object, 
i.e. it brings the distinction the subjective, first person view and the objective, 
third person view into visual explicitness. Despite this, autoscopia is generally 
not accompanied with a sensation of being split; on the contrary, the patient 
experiences herself and her Doppelgänger as unified (ibid.). This pathology seems 
to indicate that it is possible to have a sense of a unified self with a sense of 
multiplied embodiment.
In some cases of autoscopia, the experience is nearer to an out-of-body 
experience; the subjective, perceiving “I” seems to move out of the “Me” and 
to see it from the third person perspective. These experiences often occur 
with patients suffering from autoscopia but they are not confined to them 
(Feinberg 2001, p. 82); the phenomenon of “depersonalisation”, of a vivid sense of 
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advantages: in a case reported in the thirties a woman experienced her lover as two 
different people, one of whom she described as a failure while the other was virile, 
rich and satisfying (Feinberg 2001, p. 35).
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estrangement from oneself and ones surroundings at certain moments of stress 
or discomfort, often accompanied with a feeling of looking at oneself from above 
or from outside is common. A suggested explanation for this phenomenon is self-
protection by reducing the activity of the pre-frontal cortex, i.e. by tuning down 
the intensity of emotional response (Fine 2005, p. 47); the self puts some distance 
between itself and itself, so to speak, when the perceived situation is difficult 
to cope with. This finding is remarkable because it indicates the importance of 
intact emotional functions for the sense of self. In a pathological extent, this loss 
of self due to a loss of emotional responsiveness is the Cotard delusion; patients 
suffering from it are so detached from their phenomenological life, from their 
bodies and from the world that they have difficulties believing that they are alive 
(Fine 2005, p. 49); indicating that it isn’t so much the cogito that makes one exist 
as a self but rather the sentio5.
A similar common example of the fragmentation of self is the invention of 
imaginary friends or companions, usually by children. Here the imagined 
entity can be understood as an alter-ego of the inventor although at times 
they are personifications of others close to her. With adults the opaqueness of 
the invented entity tends to fade and turns into a vague sense of “a presence” 
(Feinberg 2001, p. 87). Again, these phenomena are comparable in that they 
involve discomfort or stress – the sense of disintegration of the self is, in itself, 
uncomfortable and tends to produce a variety of coping mechanisms to be 
overcome. In the case of imaginary friends however, they are actively used by the 
patient to overcome a sense of unity, which is experienced as too painful to bear. 
The tendency to confabulate is central to most, if not all these pathologies. 
Confabulations are false statements about the personal state or life of a patient, 
they are especially common in cases of amnesia and are often related to damages 
in the frontal lobes (Feinberg 2001, p. 69). Among other functions, the frontal 
lobes or more specifically the prefrontal cortex regulates emotional responses. 
The prefrontal cortex takes over twenty years to develop (Fine 2005, p. 30). In 
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5 Emotions tend to be neglected in some schools of moral thought. The resurgence of 
virtue ethics (Anscombe, G.E.M., 1958) and its fairly swift return among the main moral 
theories might partly be explained by the fact that a moral theory devoid of a proper 
explanation of the function of emotions is psychologically too crude to be satisfying. 
Bernard Williams explains the neglect of emotions in the British philosophy of the 20th 
century with the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on language, specifically “the preoccupation 
with the distinction between fact and value”, (Williams 1973, p. 208) and with the 
influence of a Kantian theory of morality (Williams 1973, p. 207). The disrepute of 
emotivism, as the theory in analytical moral philosophy, that puts weight on the role of 
emotions to the point of reducing moral judgement to emotions, also played its part in 
the rejection of emotions in morality (ibid., p. 208). 
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contrast to the “maturing” prefrontal cortex, the limbic system, which is the 
phylogenetically older part of the brain that colours experiences with emotions, 
does not mature at all (Taylor 2008, p. 18), which means that it is up to the 
prefrontal cortex to control and direct emotion. 
There are two main types of confabulations at work to create a sense of a unified 
self. “Momentary” or “provoked” confabulations are brief and occur in response 
to a situation in which a statement about the patient is expected (Feinberg 2001, 
p. 55). Other confabulations are “fantastic” or “spontaneous” and are more akin 
to delusions (Feinberg 2001, p. 57). Most confabulators share the need to “fill 
in the blanks” in their autobiographical memories but there are others whose 
urge to confabulate doesn’t seem to stem from a forgotten episodes in their 
biographical narrative. Yet in both cases, whether with the aim to unconsciously 
gloss over blank parts or to indulge in fantasies, the product is a unified self with 
a linear storyline. Such confabulations are “therapeutic”; they “help to restore 
a sense of identity and create a sense of belonging in the world that might 
otherwise be incomprehensible” (Feinberg 2001, p. 68). 
The phenomenon of confabulation also supports the conception of self as a 
narrative construction. What is worthy of being narrated, what had better be 
disregarded or suppressed is a question of the values the individual has come 
to support and thus the “constructive” work on the self involves a sense of the 
Good (Taylor 1989). A narrative in this context should be understood much more 
widely than the biographical narrative of an individual agent; it involves the 
story told by the agent to herself and others about the metaphysical structure 
of the world, of action and of morality and it is distinctly normative (Flanagan 
2009). The narration in question involves something we might call “worldview”, 
which is not independent of culturally reigning narratives about morally relevant 
aspects of life. Owen Flanagan speaks of “master-narratives” (Flanagan 2009, 
p. 54) which are commonly accepted in a given culture and which influence 
individual narratives.
If we understand this sort of a narrative, “autobiographical” self, not as 
something that should be thought of as replacing the idea of a basic, pre-
reflexive, phenomenal self but rather as an additional aspect of personhood 
which is both influenced by the stream of experiences and which helps shape the 
structure of experience, then our view of agency in general and of moral action 
in particular could profit from the distinction. Traditionally, the transcendental 
pure ego is seen as necessary for moral judgement, agency and responsibility to 
be conceivable. If it is correct to take the phenomenon of confabulation in cases 
of a sense of diffusion of the self as an indicator that a sense of meaningful and 
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intact being-in-the-world is generally cherished, then it might be possible to 
argue that mechanisms like those used against cognitive dissonance support a 
conception of agency that misrepresents both self and other. If we understand 
the most basic self and the sense thereof as necessarily being in the world and 
relational (Buber 1999) instead, then this might not only not undermine the 
notion of agency, it might on the contrary support particularist notions of moral 
agency, which emphasise the specific inter-subjectivity in a given moment. 
Additionally, pathological cases like the Capgras syndrome or the Cotard delusion 
indicate that a loss of emotional responses hinder both a sense of self and a 
sense of agency, so that the disembodied thinking ego of the cogito had better be 
complemented with a sentio, which needs yet to be fleshed out and which takes 
into account the phenomenology of the relational self. 
Broadly, what a study of pathologies of the self seems to indicate is that 
individuals are not neutral about their conceptions of self but prefer a singular, 
unified and coherent self. A sense of ownership seems to be insufficient for such a 
preferred sense of self. The autobiographical self that adds to the feeling of what 
it’s like to be me and answers to a broader question of who or what I am demands 
a fairly linear, fairly unified storyline6. Individuals seem to cherish this so much 
that they are ready to confabulate in most fantastic ways to keep up a picture 
of themselves as a singular self and agent. A phenomenological approach that 
differentiates between the various elements of self, agency and their interaction 
helps to bring out the distinctions between levels of self-awareness or self-
fictionalisation that affect attributions of consciousness, sentience, personhood, 
character, agency and accountability to self and other in morally relevant ways. A 
further investigation concerning the question of the relation between a sense of 
self and agency on the one side and patterns of (moral) judgement and behaviour 
on the other would need to be informed by empirical studies of subjects, both 
with conventional senses of self and those diagnosed with pathologies of the self 
and their respective views and habits concerning moral agency. 
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adherents of religions or worldviews advocating a No-Self approach react to a loss 
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